This paper looks at the fate of an Anglo-Irish officer in the British army during the AngloBoer War (1899-1902. Having noted the extent to which the Irish were represented in the British army, the paper tracks the career of Major-General Sir John Ardagh, director of British Military Intelligence during the greatest of Britain's imperial wars. The paper examines the way in which the British establishment used Ardagh as a scapegoat for the early reverses in the war, and how the later disclosure of evidence vindicated Ardagh, but effectively ended his career.
The Irish in the British army
In terms of manpower, expense, munitions and duration, the Anglo-Boer war (October 1899 to May 1902) was the greatest imperial war the British empire ever fought. It involved troops from India, Canada, the Australian colonies, New Zealand, the Cape and Natal, as well as hundreds of thousands of troops from the British army, the militia regiments and the reservists. But by the time the war concluded, with a British victory and the annexation of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the casualty list was the highest for any colonial war in the history of the British empire before or after. The While this is a modest number of casualties by First World War standards twelve years later, it was not so by contemporary imperial standards. The casualty lists in the campaigns in Zululand, West Africa, Afghanistan and the Sudan were nowhere near as high and consequently had not caused much concern in Britain. Nor indeed, up till the South African war, had the occasional imperial defeat caused such an outcry. More times than not the British press put a jingo twist on any military disaster, such as portraying "noble" General Colley at Majuba and "defiant" General Gordon at Khartoum. Any ensuing British victory, such as General Roberts' occupation of Kabul or the destruction of the Zulu capital at Ulundi, soon soothed British public opinion and airbrushed away the memory of any defeats not yet avenged.
Ireland played an important part in the South African war 3 . While two Irish commandos, or Irish Transvaal Brigades, numbering no more than 500 men, gained much publicity and support in nationalist Ireland, in fact the under-researched role of the Irish on the British front was more significant. So significant indeed that Irish nationalist politicians, while denouncing the war, made capital out of "Irish valour" on the battlefield and accused the British as using Irish regi- 1899-1902, vol 
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British Military Intelligence
British Military Intelligence dated from 1873, but had long antecedence as generals had always found intelligence to be of value to them in the field 8 . In the British Indian empire, the political officers, usually military men seconded to the civil authority, acted in part as bureaucratic and magistrates, but also often as intelligence officers. In the British army the intelligence section tended to be connected to the Quarter-Master's or the Adjutant-General's offices, or to both. 14 . About the time of John Ardagh's birth, the parish was described as "aggregately chilly in appearance and averagely poor in character 15 ". Before John Ardagh became famous the most notable product of the parish was John Palliser (1817-1887), the geographer and Arctic explorer 16 . John Ardagh's father was of the pre-disestablished Anglican cleric in Ireland mould: a gentleman farmer, sportsman and larger than life. His son was more reserved. John went to a private academy in Waterford run by a Dr Price before proceeding, at the age of 16 in July 1856, to Trinity College, Dublin. At Trinity, Ardagh was a contemporary of a glittering array of future notables, including the future eminent Irish historian W. E. H. Lecky and the classicist and future provost of Trinity, Rev. Sir John Pentland Mahaffy
17 . An aptitude for mathematics soon scuppered a career in the church and led Ardagh into engineering and the Royal Engineers. There followed an extraordinary career, often serving either as an military engineer or as a field intelligence officer, which took Ardagh to Iceland, the Levant, Malta, the Balkans, the congress of Berlin, demarcating the boundaries of Bulgaria and Greece, action in the Egyptian/Sudan debacle and six years in India, where he was private secretary to the viceroy. For a period he also served as a section head in the army's intelligence division in London.
But despite all his military service, Ardagh was not of the fighting soldier mould. He was quiet, polite, efficient, an excellent committee man, an organiser and a fixer -be it of military fortifications, commissions of inquiry or negotiated treaties. At the age of 55, John Ardagh married Susan Hamilton (1854-1935), the widow of the earl of Malmesbury. After his death Susan Ardagh wrote of him:
He had travelled nearly all over the world. He was reserved and silent; cold, perhaps, to strangers, but warm-hearted to his friends, and, although a man of the world and a soldier, had the guileless disposition of a child 18 .
Ardagh was known by his staff, who looked upon him "with a mixture of respect, curiosity, and awe" as the 
Scapegoat
In one of his precise and well-written minutes, Ardagh once commented that, "the good Intelligence officer can seldom hope to find his work, as a whole, understood or its magnitude realised 20 ". It is the timeless cry of the intelligence officer down the decades. And this was certainly the case in the year before and the opening months of the South African war. The link between the Intelligence Department and the War Office was not what it should have been, with the former being regarded as little more than a convenient reference library 21 . One of the problems was that Ardagh's office was in Queen Anne's Gate while Viscount Wolseley (1833-1913), another Irish mandarin and then British army commander-in-chief (1895-1901), was across St James's Park in Pall Mall. An "out of sight, out of mind" mentality existed in the War Office with regard to the Intelligence Department. Major Griffiths described the War Office buildings as a "labyrinth of dark staircases and blind passages situated on the south side of Pall Mall, which is still as difficult to perambulate as when Charles Gordon refused to remain there, saying it was easier to find his way about Central Africa 22 ". This "poor cousin" status is clearly illustrated by the fact that Ardagh's annual budget for running the seven sections of Military intelligence, including the library and mapping section was a meagre £11,000. By contrast, the annual budget of the Transvaal Republic for Intelligence was £92,000 23 . Even by the end of the war, but with additional responsibilities, the annual budget for British Military Intelligence stood at only £28,000 24 . While Ardagh wrote one warning memorandum after another and even had his section produce a 119-page book on the military capacity of the Boer republics, his section was largely ignored. His department's situation of near penury dictated that only twelve intelligence officers were despatched to South Africa prior to the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer war. And while General White had the good fortune to have Ardagh's deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Althram, with him at Ladysmith, the intelligence situation when the war commenced was fairly dire. As the war correspondent for The Times observed several years later: We did not spend nearly enough money, or send enough [Intelligence] offi cers. Th e eight or ten, or a dozen offi cers who went out did very good work, I know, but they were fewer than the men I employed myself as "Times" correspondents anywhere, or even a commercial traveller, with the sums of money they were given 25 .
Frederick -1933) , a sectional head at Queen Anne's Gate. "Wully" Robertson, "was heartily glad to escape from the depressing and uncongenial atmosphere common to official life in London in time of war 27 ". But it was exactly that "depressing and uncongenial atmosphere" which faced John Ardagh, left back in Britain's capital, especially as he had lost both Althram and Robertson to the war front.
It was not long before Queen Anne's Gate came under strong criticism. The thrust of this attack on Ardagh's department was multi-pronged: that it had failed to estimate the strength of the Boers; that it was ignorant of the armaments' aid to the Boers; that it failed to guess the Boer's offensive plans relating to Natal; that no warning was given to the government about the Boer plans; and that British troops in the field were left without maps and topographical information 28 . Matters came to a head when Wolseley, commander in chief of the army and Ardagh's immediate superior, made a speech in which he openly criticised Military Intelligence for not giving sufficient information regarding the Boers. He claimed that, "We found that the enemy who declared war against us much more powerful than we anticipated". This was an extraordinary attack, not least because Ardagh reported directly to Wolseley as commander in chief of the army. This attack was picked up by The Times , which asserted quite bluntly, "For most of our 25 [recent] reverses the blame must rest with our Intelligence Department, whose information was throughout defective 29 ". Ardagh was greatly shocked. He had regarded his fellow Irishman in Pall Mall as a friend. But Wolseley was very sharp and ever aware of what the wider world was saying -which was that things had not gone well in South Africa. Three South African towns with British garrisons had been besieged by Boer forces and in one week alone in December 1899, Black Week, the British army had suffered humiliating defeats or setbacks at Stormberg (10 December), Magersfontein (11 December) and Colenso (15 December). Not unnaturally, the British press was asking why this and the subsequent setback at Spion Kop (24 January 1900) had happened. It was abundantly clear that the British had seriously under-estimated the Boers. All this had put Wolseley, along with the equivocal Secretary for War, the Marquis of Lansdowne -yet another Anglo-Irish grandee -in a tricky position 30 . Pressed by his wife, Ardagh went to see Wolseley, who feigned a misunderstanding: "Oh, my dear fellow, of course, I never meant anything of the sort. I am speaking at the Mansion House in a few days, and I will make a point of putting the matter right." Needless to say, Wolseley did not keep his promise.
Ardagh had several reasons to feel Wolseley's public attack was an unjust travesty of the true situation. In Ardagh's papers, there are copies of no fewer than seven memoranda dating from June 1896 to September 1899, written either by Ardagh or his senior officials, giving the government details of the military preparations being made by the Boer republics 31 . These unambiguously set out the dangers facing the British. The October 1896 Ardagh memorandum is clearly typed and states, "As the Transvaal is almost entirely surrounded by British territory this large expenditure [£1.5 million so far that year on military preparations] can have no other explanation than an anticipation of war, or an intention of aggression against this country, and its supremacy in South Africa". It later states that 48,000 burghers are available to fight. The cover sheet shows that the memorandum was copied to the commander in chief of the army, to the Before that, however, Davitt sent a copy of the book to a New York newspaper, from which the matter was quickly picked up by the London Standard . The British press was not slow to realise that Military Intelligence had been made a scapegoat. One newspaper bluntly commented, "The Intelligence Department did its work faithfully and well". In late November 1900, The Times , realising that Ardagh had indeed produced documents relating to the strength and the nature of military preparations by the Boers, carried the following:
Th e War Offi ce possesses an Intelligence Department whose duty it is to collect information as to the military organisation and armaments of other Powers; but it is nobody's business to study the requirements of "inevitable" wars, and offi cials absorbed in army trivial questions, which ought never to reach Pall-Mal, could not be expected to fi nd time for the 33 due consideration of matters of national importance. Th ere is no diffi culty in obtaining the fullest information, as to the resources of the Transvaal and the Free State, and we have been offi cially informed that "the armed strength of the Boers, the number of their guns, with their character and calibre", as laid down in the report of the Director of Intelligence [Ardagh], "corresponds exactly with our recently ascertained knowledge of what the enemy has put into the fi eld". Whether or not these reports ever travelled from Queen Anne's-Gate to Pall-mall seems uncertain, since the Commander-in-Chief publically stated that "We have found that the enemy… are much more powerful and numerous than we expected". Th e report of the Intelligence Department seems, therefore, to have been as valueless for practical purposes as were those transmitted to Paris by Colonel Stoff el prior to the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian war, and Lord Wolseley was apparently as little aware of the fi ghting reserves of the Boers as was Marshal Leboeuf of those of the Germans 36 .
As the existence of Military notes was now public knowledge and no longer confidential, the War Office could not continue, on the grounds of secrecy, to refuse Ardagh's renewed demand that it be republished and made public.
Ardagh now got agreement for the document to be placed before both of houses of the British parliament. In the end it was republished, but as only 50 copies were printed, it was not widely distributed. Of course, the government was now embarrassed, which did not endear Ardagh greatly to them. As Lady Ardagh noted, their subsequent half-hearted public support for Military Intelligence "made things look blacker than if they had said nothing at all 37 ". The reality was, as The Times chief correspondent noted, "the Intelligence Department got some information [about Boer military preparedness before the war], and the heads of the War Office glanced at it in their spare time, and having been in South Africa themselves 20 or 30 years before, gave their personal impressions to the Government, but the whole thing was sketchy and worthless 38 ". This matter placed a great strain on Ardagh. On top of the controversy and the need to direct his department in time of war, he had other responsibilities. These included working on a committee investigating trans-oceanic telegraph cables as well as the implementation of the Hague Convention of early 1899. Concerning the latter, one of the matters which Ardagh had to defend was the British insistence that it had the right to use expanding bullets, or dum-dum bullets. The British position on dum-dum bullets was what it had been in 1889, that possession of these was necessary, in case "we have to deal with savages or with an enemy who is himself using an expanded bullet 39 ". It is little wonder that Ardagh became ill and was off duty for some time, his place being taken in Military Intelligence in an acting capacity by Colonel William Everett .
In March 1901 Ardagh's five-year term as director of Military Intelligence came to an end. There is no evidence that any attempt was made to renew it. Ardagh certainly had nothing lined up for himself in advance. That was not as he behaved 40 . In a confidential memorandum written a few days before he left Queen Anne's Gate Ardagh, in his succinct and clear style, laid out the history and work of the department, ending "my object is Things were now more bureaucratic, more regimented and less personalised. Nicholson had no dry humorous notice in his office stating that when you visit a man of business, tell him quickly your business, leave him to his business and go about your own business.
John Ardagh was awarded the Queen's medal for the war. The reason for this was most likely because after he left Military Intelligence, and while the war was being fought, he sat on a commission established to investigate claims against Britain in relation to the hundreds of foreign "undesirables" whom the British had deported from South Africa during the war 42 . This commission brought Ardagh to South Africa for a six-month period of travelling round the region (December 1901 to June 1902).
In writing to his wife from South Africa he made an interesting observation relating to the effectiveness of British censorship:
I send you a Johannesburg Star , by glancing over which you will perceive how very little information or comment is allowed to leak out here. Not a single word has transpired in the local papers about Lord Methuen's operations of late, and I shall imitate the censor's reserve, as you will know much more than I do, long before this reaches you. We only hear (barring confi dential communications) what has taken place when the English newspapers come out a month afterwards paredness for the war. Moreover, the commission relied heavily on information supplied to it by the Intelligence Department. The report stated of the Intelligence Department, "that it was undermanned for the work of preparing for a great war will scarcely be denied. But a considerable measure of success must be admitted". Regarding the major criticism of Intelligence that it failed to supply adequate maps for use in the field, the report observed, "the outcry therefore in regard to the absence of good maps was not altogether well-informed 48 
